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Abstract: 
 
In this paper, micro-finance programme through joint liability credit contract is explained with the help 
of two-stage game when the programme is operated by a non-motivated NGO with the help of 
commercial bank and government. We find that even in the presence of public-private cooperation and 
back ended subsidy provided by the government, both individual sanction as well as social sanction 
plays an important role of security against credit for proper functioning of the programme. Non-
homogeneity among the group members may allow the socially powerful member to force her less 
powerful co-member to repay her debt with interest and enjoy free ride after taking the advantage of 
joint liability. We have also proved that the non-motivated NGO who itself plays the function of the 
self-help group can offer credit to the group members at lowest possible rate of interest and can arrange 
sufficient training for the group members for skill improvement after group formation if and only if it 
gets sufficient financial support from the government in the initial period and if the linked commercial 
bank choose low lending rate to the group in credit-linkage programme. This will also encourage each 
group member to enhance compulsory savings at maximum amount in each installment in her 
respective group in both the periods, which ultimately will help her to get higher amount of credit in 
each period to improve consumption of the member household progressively.  
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SAVINGS, LENDING RATE AND SKILL IMPROVEMENT IN MICRO 
FINANCE OPERATING THROUGH PUBLIC PRIVATE COOPERATION 
 
 
                Micro-finance is emerging as a powerful instrument for poverty alleviation programme in the 
developing countries. This is actually a bank linkage program aimed at a cost effective mechanism for 
providing financial services to the untreated poor. This financial system enables the poor to generate 
savings habit. Growing amount of savings can improve the confidence among the participants of micro-
finance programme in investing and expanding the income-generating activity as well as household 
income. Micro-credit contract under joint liability has received a lot of attention in recent years. 
Borrowers linked by joint liability have to help through repaying the debt of her co-member if she fails to 
repay that. The group lending system induces the borrowers to monitor each other mainly in a costless 
way. The success of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has raised hopes that group-lending schemes can 
be used as an instrument of channeling formal sector credit to the rural poor with very high rate of 
repayment compared to other schemes that lend to the poor. Hossein (1998) argued that Grameen Bank of 
Bangladesh has a repayment rate more than 95%. Similar figure was obtained by Morduch (1999). This 
has prompted other countries and NGOs to adopt similar types of scheme. 
There have been several important contributions that seek to explain the success of such micro-finance 
scheme. Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990) gave explanations on the basis of peer monitoring. They argued 
that group members have better information about their co members compared to the lenders. So peer 
monitoring is relatively cheaper compared to bank monitoring, which ultimately leads to greater 
monitoring and greater rates of repayment. Ghatak (1999) argued that joint liability and self-selection 
mechanism will always club together safe-borrowers at the time of group formation and risky borrowers 
with no assets and individuals coming from ultra poor section are totally ignored. So the repayment rate is 
very high. Van Tassel (1999), Ghatak and Gunnane (1999) analyzed; moral hazard problems in-group 
lending can be checked through social sanction. Roy Chowdrury (2005) proved that though monitoring is 
cheap, ordinary group lending becomes infeasible even in the presence of joint liability. He had shown 
that ordinary group-lending scheme involved either sequential financing or a combination of lender 
monitoring and joint liability. He also said in the presence of severe problem of under monitoring, the 
joint liability might not ensure the feasibility of group lending scheme. He has also shown that in the 
presence of involuntary default the group-lending scheme with sequential financing but without joint-
liability may be feasible (Roy Chowdhury 2007).   
  In India, micro-finance program under joint liability system is operating through formation of Self-Help 
Group which is a small voluntary association of poor people preferably from the same socio economic 
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background. Government of India has promoted micro-finance program under SGSY scheme which is 
gradually becoming very much popular in India. District Rural Development Authority (DRDA) of the 
state government sometimes from their own initiative or sometimes with the help of a NGO operates it 
after forming self-help group in this SGSY scheme. So in that type of micro-finance programme we 
observe the presence of government, bank and NGO. The United Interagency Committee on Integrated 
Rural Development for Asia and the Pacific (1992) (henceforth UNICIRDP) mentioned six features of a 
NGO such as: they are voluntary, non-profit, service and development oriented, autonomous, highly 
motivated and committed and operate under some form of formal registration (see also Besley and Ghatak 
(1999). In India, most of the NGOs still now confine themselves at the time of group formation and 
nurturing of the group. Direct loans are provided to the group by the banks after he gains confidence 
about the viability of lending to the group. Now large number of Self-Help Groups is required to be linked 
by small number of Commercial Banks. Following NABARD, it is now become more convenient for a 
bank to give more responsibities to the NGO. So apart from bearing the above responsibilities the NGO 
also have to manage the fund granted in the name of a Self-Help Group (SHG) by the government and the 
bank as facilitating agency. It also has to arrange skill-improvement training programme for the group 
members. Roy and Roy Chowdhury (2007) proved that full involvement of a NGO in a micro-credit 
programme under joint liability is optimal when the village is either relatively too rich or relatively too 
poor. In this model we consider the microfinance programme under SGSY scheme when the group 
members are mainly belongs to economically backward class. Most of the group members are 
housewives, living in a same locality and have very little chance to migrate to other places. The elected 
group leader of each SHG has to synchronize all the financial activities of the group members. Sometimes 
it is difficult for her to do that. In this situation NGO can play the leading role. It can do all the duties, 
which the group leader has to do for her group. A NGO is formed mainly through non-profit route. 
i
 But 
in actual practice, the NGO itself is not a motivated one but a risk averse. Due to this the NGO charges 
very high rate of interest against loan to the group members
ii
 which may dampen the possibility of any 
significant economic improvement of the rural poor. It also raises the question about the sustainability of 
the group. In this paper we want to derive the conditions at which a self-help group can sustain and the 
group members can improve their consumption progressively when the group is running with the help of 
NGO and financial assistance from the government through DRDA. So a micro-finance programme has 
become under public-private cooperation where the private agent is the profit maximizer NGO and the 
public agencies are bank and government. Besley and Coates (1995) and Bond and Rai (2008) had shown 
the importance of both social sanction and individual sanction as instruments to enforce repayment in the 
presence of joint liability. But following Morduch (2005), using social sanction as collateral has 
limitations. According to him social sanction involves excluding defaulted borrowers from privileged 
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access to input supplies, from further trade, credit, from social and religious events and from day to day 
courtesies. But in this model the cost of social sanction for the voluntary defaulters will be much higher 
because they will be deprived from getting any future economic benefit of the government through local 
panchayet. This paper will re-establish the importance of social punishment as collateral for proper 
functioning of the government supported micro-finance programme. In Besley and Coates and Bond and 
Rai models nothing was told about the savings of individual group members. This paper wants to 
investigate how maximum savings can be generated among the members and with this we shall also have 
to find out the way at which the NGO can arrange high skill training for the members.  
Initially we assume that two homogeneous members belong to the same village community form self-help 
group on the basis of joint liability only for two periods. The group is formed through the initiative of a 
N.G.O. whose basic activities are (i) motivating local housewives to form self-help group, (ii) collecting 
savings (contribution) from them in each instalment and give them technical knowledge for the skill 
improvement of the participants at the initial stage (iii), bridge the gap between the group and the bank as 
well as the government, (iv) maintain the group corpus, (v) collect subsidy as well as cash credit from the 
District Rural Development Agency and Bank respectively (vi) disbursed credit simultaneously to both 
the members and recover credit from the members and obviously (vii) to generate few profit after 
performing all those activities at the end of second period. So the NGO is here non-motivated who 
actually wants to improve the economic condition of both the members in a symmetric way and want to 
earn few profits after performing it’s duties. Here, equal amount of loan is sanctioned simultaneously to 
both the members. The group loan is symmetric and both agents receive a cosigned loan (when both are 
cosigners). Initially we ignore the possibility of weaker borrower and stronger borrower in the same group 
as developed by Bond and Rai (2008) rather following Kundu (2008) we assume that both the group 
members are economically and socially homogeneous during the time of group formation. In this model 
we also assume that the NGO is getting financial assistance from the government directly in the first stage 
and indirectly in the second stage. But the contribution from the government to the group through the 
NGO in the second stage of the model depends on the performance of the group in the first stage. The 
NGO in this model can take any among the two following possible actions.  
1. During the time of group formation it totally ignores the importance of social sanction in the micro-
finance programme. So the NGO does not give any credible threat to both the group members about social 
punishment after voluntary default in any stage of the game. 
2. It cautions the group members about social punishment. Actually if it is detected that any group member 
or both the group member voluntarily defaults in any of the two periods then the NGO will report against 
her to local Panchayet and the defaulted members will be deprived from getting any type of assistance 
from the Panchayet or any household of the community in which she belongs.  
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This paper is divided into four sections. In Section-1 we will discuss the possible outcomes of government 
subsidized micro finance program in total absence of social section. In Section-2 we assume the presence 
of both social and individual sanction of this micro-finance programme and then we shall investigate the 
possible outcomes of that micro-fiance programme. In Section-3 we consider the presence of only social 
sanction but total absence of individual sanction and try to find out the reasons why this is most desirable 
to fulfill the basic objective of micro-finance programme. In Section-4 considering both the group 
members and the NGO as risk averse we shall want to decide the maximum level of savings a group 
member can do in each instalment and the maximum lending rate the non-motivated NGO can charge 
against credit. We shall also want to find out the exact policy at which the NGO can arrange sufficient 
skill-training for both the group-members and can charge lending rate as low as possible.     
SECTION-1 
Suppose each member of the group is willing to contribute (save) x amount in each instalment and each 
member has to contribute 2t times in each year
iii
. The amount saved by each group member in each 
instalment is deposited in the office of the NGO and the NGO keeps that in the linked commercial bank. 
We assume that before getting 1
st
 credit from her group, each member has to save t times regularly. In this 
period she is getting also skill-training from the NGO without spending any amount. Total amount 
accumulated in the group after contributing‘t’ times by each member is  when 
.
iv
  The NGO withdraws  from bank and distributes that equally among the group members as 
credit against the rate of interest v . It is also assumed that the there is no uncertainty in our model and the 
entire credit is used by both the members individually for investment in income generating activities and 
the return from that activity after the end of the period is totally verifiable. The income earned by each 
member after utilizing microcredit as working capita can be expressed as   
                                                       
Here  is the degree of technical knowledge gained by each group member after group formation from the 
NGO when . It is also assumed that the husbands of both the members are earning members and 
ready to contribute their entire income for their family. The annual earning of the husband of each group 
member is ‘W’ and vi. At the end of the 1st stage we have four possible levels of consumption of 
both the member households. If the group member is well behaved and is ready to repay her own loan 
with interest at the end of the year then the consumption of the non-defaulter member household will be  
)……………………………..(Eq.2) Where vii 
We consider that  .  
But the group member may voluntarily depart the group just after getting credit in the middle of the 1
st
 
stage. If that happens then according to the condition of joint her fellow group member has to repay her 
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entire amount of credit at the end of stage 1. Now at this stage she fails to earn such an amount so that she 
can also repay her partner’s entire loan with interest apart from repaying her own loan. So she is asked by 
the NGO to pay extra ‘k’ amount when   and in return she can withdraw her entire savings 
done in the first period with interest. For the simplicity of our model we assume that both the borrowing 
and lending rate of the commercial bank is identical and that is  which is given in our entire model. So 
the consumption level of the non-defaulter group member household after the end of the first stage will 
become  
) – k +2Xi……………(Eq.3) when  
A group member may depart her group just after getting first credit either assuming that her co-member 
will repay few part of her loan or her co-member will also follow her footsteps. The consumption level of 
the group member households in both the situations can be expressed as 
 But the group member(s) who defaults voluntarily just after 
getting credit, can never recover her savings done before getting first credit. The group will enjoy 
government subsidy and credit-linkage of the linked commercial bank only if the repayment rate is 100%.  
Now the consumption level of the voluntarily defaulted household after the end of the first stage of our 
game in absence of social sanction will be  
  
The consumption matrix of both the players in the first stage of the game is narrated in Table-1 
Table-1 
  Member-2  
  Repay              Default 
Member-1 Repay Earn 
 
and move into 
second stage 
 
 Default   
                                                                                                   …………………………………….(Eq.5) 
Now the group can get cash credit from the commercial bank and subsidy from the government at the 
beginning of the second stage of our model as proportion of group corpus of that group accumulated after 
the end of first stage. The NGO who is working on behalf of SHG deposits the entire saving done by the 
members after getting first credit in the commercial bank which cannot be withdrawn. The total 
accumulated savings of the group if both the group members repay their loan individually will be 
 . Again total earnings of the group from 
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recovery of loan will be . So total group corpus of the grade-1 passed group after the end of 1
st
 stage 
of our model will be …………(Eq.6) 
From Eq.6 it is clear that ‘X’, ‘i’ and ‘r’ all play a significant positive role during the time of calculating 
group corpus of the group. 
In that situation the net earnings of the non-motivated NGO will be 
 ……………(Eq.7)  
when the cost of skill training incurred by the NGO for both the members in the first stage is expressed as 
.  
If we assume that  amount is sanctioned by the government to group as non-returnable back-
ended subsidy and the linked commercial bank sanctioned  amount of loan for the group against 
rate of interest ‘i’ due to credit linkage programme, then total revolving fund of the group at the beginning 
of the second period will be .  
Now the entire sanctioned amount is collected by the NGO on behalf of the group. But the NGO does not 
disburse the entire amount as loan to both the group members. Rather decides to disburse ‘ ’ 
fraction of the revolving fund (which is administered) as loan to both the group members equally and 
keep the remaining (1-a) portion in the commercial bank. So amount of credit sanctioned for each group 
member is   
Both the group members here also invest the entire amount of credit for income generating activity from 
which the income is totally verifiable. We also assume that both the group members have already earned 
few experiences for operating the same income generating activity done in the first stage, which also 
makes their individual skill double in the second stage. So the income of a representative group member 
from her income generating activity in the second stage of our model will be 
                                           ………………………………..(Eq.8). 
Total amount each group member has to repay at the end of the second stage against rate of interest ‘r’ 
will be  .  
In the second stage of our model, the non-defaulter group member is capable enough to repay not only her 
own loan but also her partner’s loan with interest. As the game will end after the second stage, the NGO 
announces that an honest non defaulter group member can recover her entire savings with few bonus 
amounts at the end of the second stage just after repayment of loan. So the total reward announced by the 
NGO to each member as a prize of her honesty will be 
   
We have four possible amount of consumption of a group member household and these are as follows. 
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If both the group members repay their loan individually at the end of second stage of our game then the 
consumption level of a member household will be  
 
If one member defaults voluntarily then following the condition of joint liability the other member has to 
repay her entire credit with interest. But here the NGO as reward not only returns her the entire saving 
with bonus but also the savings deposit of her partner. Then her consumption will be  
 
A member can voluntarily default just after getting credit for the second time. If that situation happens 
then the consumption level of the group member will be  
 
Now we consider the following assumptions: 
Assumption-1:  
Assumption-2: b > 2 
Assumption- 3:  
Proposition: 1 If    holds i.e. the announced reward against one unit of savings 
done in the first period after repayment of loan at the end of the second stage of the game is more than the 
marginal expense an honest group member has to incur to repay her loan with interest then even in total 
absence of both social and individual sanction both members will repay their loan individually at the end 
of the second stage of our game 
Proof: 
If it is observed that both the group members leave the group just after receiving loan for the second time, 
then in absence of any punishment the consumption level of any group member will be  
 
 
 
So the game in the second stage can be written in the following way  
 Member-2 
Member-
1 
 Repay Default 
Repay 
 
 
 
Default 
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As  (which actually supports the initial 
condition) holds then (Repay, Repay ) will be the unique Nash Equilibrium at the second stage of our 
game. 
 As we want to solve the two stage game through backward induction method, the consumption matrix of          
        both the member households the first stage can be written as follows 
 
 
Member-1 
 Member-2 
Repay Default 
Repay  
 
 
Default   
 
If   holds, then 
we have two sub game perfect Nash Equilibrium of this two stage game and those are (Repay, Repay) and 
(Default, Default).  
So if the net income of the non-defaulter group member in the second stage is higher than the total 
expenses she has to incur as loan repayment and compulsory savings after taking 1
st
 loan from the group 
then (Repay, Repay) will be the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium in this two stage game and the group 
sustains for both the periods. But if aggregate of interest payment and payment for joint liability is more 
than her return from savings deposit at the end of the first stage after the break down of the group then the 
group will not survive and (Default, Default ) will be the only sub game perfect Nash equilibrium. So in 
absence of any social threat, there exists uncertainty about the sustainability of the group for both the 
periods.  
Again if we look at the income profile of the NGO, it is observed that in the first sub game perfect Nash 
equilibrium the income of the NGO in the first phase was   and at the end of the 
second stage that was  But if we observed second sub 
game perfect Nash Equilibrium then   and   . As it is clear that    
the NGO to remove the possibility of breakdown of a self-help group in the middle of the game, will give 
credible threat to both the member households about social punishment after voluntary default which 
becomes essential.  
So both the member households should be very much cautious before taking any decision on voluntary 
default. Hence in the next section we shall include both social and individual sanction at the time of 
measuring consumption level of the group member households.  A member will face social sanction if she 
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defaults voluntarily and face individual sanction from her fellow group member who has to repay her loan 
with interest.  
Section-2   
Assumption- 4:  
NGO warns both the group members that if both of them jointly default voluntarily in any stage, then that 
will be reported to local panchayet and both will face severe social sanction like being deprived from 
getting benefit from different government supported programmes. Like previous section the earning of a 
member in the second stage of our model is capable enough to repay the entire loan of her fellow 
dishonest member apart from her own loan. If that situation appears then the honest member can impose 
individual sanction on her dishonest co-member but as the earning of the NGO is unaffected, the 
dishonest member will not face any social sanction. Here we assume that in the second stage the social 
position of both the members are not same. One has become more powerful and the other is less. In this 
situation, the value of individual sanction faced by less socially powerful member from her socially more 
powerful member after voluntary default is more than the value of individual sanction faced by socially 
more powerful member from her less socially powerful co-member in the same situation. So some 
consumption level of both the members in different situations will be changed. In the 1
st
 stage of our 
model  Let S1 be the present discounted value of social 
sanction faced by both the members if and only if both defaults voluntarily at the end of second stage. So  
 
In the second stage  If S21 is the present discounted 
value of loss faced by the voluntarily defaulted 1
st
 member after facing individual sanction from her 
fellow member then her consumption at the end of second period will be 
 
Similarly if S12 is the present discounted value of loss faced by the defaulted 2
nd
 member from 1
st
 member 
then  the consumption of the second member at the end of the second stage of the game will be  
 
If S21> S12 then we can claim that 2
nd
 member is socially more powerful than the 1
st
 member but only in 
the second stage of our game.  
If it is observed that both the members default voluntarily in the second stage then their consumption 
remains unchanged and that will be  
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So the consumption matrix in the second stage of our model can be written as  
 Member-2 
Member-1  Repay Default 
Repay  
 
 
 
Default  
 
 
 
 
Assumption 5: 
  
         Following the above assumption we can say (Repay, Default) will be the only Nash Equilibrium in 
the second stage of our game. So we can say that socially powerful group member taking the advantage of 
joint liability defaults voluntarily after shifting the entire burden of loan on the shoulder of her fellow 
socially less powerful member and ignore to recover her savings deposit with . 
Now following back ward induction method the consumption matrix in the first stage of our game will be   
 
 
Member-1 
 Member-2 
Repay Default 
Repay  
 
 
Default   
                                                               ……………………………………………………………..(Eq.19) 
Now if S1 is very high then from equation (14) we can say . So (Repay, 
Repay) will be the only sub game perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game, i.e. in the presence of high 
social punishment for the group members after voluntary default, both will behave co-operatively in 
stage-1 so that the game can be proceeded in to the next stage.  
Again as  we can say total burden a non defaulter group member 
has to face for repayment of loan is more the net gain a member can earn to follow the condition of joint 
liability. So ultimately, total amount of consumption of the non defaulter as well as  socially less powerful 
group member is less than the total amount of consumption of the dishonest socially more powerful 
member from this two stages government supported micro-finance programme i.e. 
. So if we want to improve the consumption pattern of both the individuals simultaneously in 
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a symmetric way through this micro-finance programme then it will be better if both the members should 
not become socially powerful in unequal way even in the second stage of our game If that situation 
happens then obviously S12 = S21. For the simplicity of our model we shall now make the following 
assumption. 
Assumption-6 :  S12 = S21= 0.  
On the basis of the above assumptions, in the next section we shall have to derive the conditions at which 
both can improve their economic conditions in a symmetric way.   
Section-3 
In total absence of individual sanction, there will be no change in the consumption pattern of the 
participants in the first stage of the game as mentioned in the equations (2), (3), (4) and (14). Similarly in 
the second stage  also remains unchanged as mentioned in equations (10) and 
(11). Now only change will be observed in . We have already assumed the 
domain of ‘b’.  
Now if  holds (Repay, Repay) will be the only Nash 
equilibrium in the second stage of our game. So high value of social sanction is playing a significant role 
to force the group members to repay their loan individually. 
As we want to solve the game through backward induction method, (Repay, Repay) will be the only sub 
game perfect Nash Equilibrium in our model when due to high S1 the values of both 
 It is also observed that total consumption of both the players 
individually becomes maximum and equal and the consumption of the member household at the end of 
the second stage is more than that of the first stage.  In this situation the income of the NGO after the end 
of second stage will be  
 ……………………………………(Eq.20) 
Following assumption-4, I2 > 0.  
Section-4: 
So we already have derived the conditions on the basis of which we can claim in this two stage game both 
the self-help group members in government subsidized and credit-linked micro finance programme is 
benefited equally after the end of second stage and the NGO in both the periods earn positive profit. We 
have also noticed that both ‘X’ and ‘r’ play an important role at the time of determining group corpus of 
the group after the end of first stage. In this model, ‘x’ is decided by the group member and ‘r’ is decided 
by the NGO on behalf of the group. If both the representative group member and the NGO are risk averse 
then we have to decide how the group corpus can be improved in the first stage at low borrowing rate but 
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higher amount of compulsory savings in each instalment. We consider quasi linear utility function of the 
representative group member household who wants to maximize utility through optimizing ‘x’ when both 
‘r’ and ‘i’ are given to him and ’.   
The objective function of the representative group member will be   
   
Subject to  
Proposition -2: Each group member wants to save maximum amount in each installment. 
Proof: 
In the presence of two inequality constraint, the above optimization problem will be an unconstrained 
optimization problem when the choice variable of a member is only ‘x’ when tx = X. The first order 
condition will give  
 
The equation expressed in (21) will give the optimum value of ‘x’ say ‘x*’.  
Second order condition will give  
It is observed that  A rural household will participate in micro-finance 
programme after forming self-help group provided      
This is a participating constraint and it is written in inequality form to make the problem interesting.  
Assumption-6:   
Proposition-3: High skill training will always encourage the self-help group members to save more in 
each installment at given ‘r’ and ‘i’. 
Proof: From equation (22) and on the basis of Assumption-6 we have  
 
Proposition-4 : High borrowing rate discourages the self-help group members to save more in each 
installment when  and ‘i’ is kept undisturbed   
Proof: Again from equation (22) and on the basis of Assumption-6 we have 
 
Again at e also have  
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So we can say  which shows that to enhance savings of 
each group member in each installment low ‘r’ and high ‘ ’ and ‘i’ is always desirable. But as ‘r’ is 
decided by the Non-motivated NGO it is obvious that both  and ‘i’ will also influence ‘r’.   
Proposition -5 : A non-motivated NGO will always want to keep ‘r’ at maximum level. 
Proof. We shall consider the utility function of the NGO is also quasi linear when . 
 
The Non motivated NGO at the time of maximizing utility has to consider the following two constraints 
(1) The participation constraint expressed as  
(2) Incentive constraint expressed through (22) 
(3) And third constraint  
If we consider the participation constraint is not binding then the above optimization problem will again 
become an unconstrained optimization problem. So the first order condition (keeping 
will give 
 
We can also show that  
So following (Eq.27) we can say that the non-motivated NGO will always want to keep the lending rate at 
maximum level 
Proposition-6: If the NGO wants to arrange higher and more efficient skill training for both the members, 
then it will have to charge higher lending rate at given ‘i’. 
Proof: The Eq.27 also gives 
 
i+rr—b− iidθ+4Xθ1−ai2+i+r+r2dθ +V′′rdr∗=0 
If we consider  then we can say 
                                                                  ……………………….(Eq. 28) 
Proposition-7: The NGO can charge comparatively low lending rate at given  and unchanged ‘i’ 
provided it gets sufficient government grant at the initial period. 
Proof: From Eq. 27 we have, 
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As  
So ultimately we have . 
Again maximum amount of savings done by each member in each instalment can now be expressed as   
……………………………….(Eq. 31) 
 From the above relation we can conclude that the savings decision done by the representative group 
member in each instalment in both the stages is influenced by the rate of interest charged by the NGO 
against credit, the financial support the NGO can gain in the first stage of our model  from government, 
the quality of skill training she can get from the NGO after joining micro-finance programme and lending 
as well as the borrowing rate of the commercial bank. 
Proposition-8: Higher government grant to the NGO in the first stage will encourage the group members 
to save more in each instalment when : 
Proof: 
 
Suppose, in our model ‘ G’ is increased to  and ‘x’ rises to 
. High ‘G’ will also encourage the NGO to spend more on skill development of both the group 
members. 
Proposition-9: High and more efficient skill training will discourage the group member to save larger 
amount in each installment in her group at given ‘i’. 
Proof: 
 
The first term of the above expression is negative and the second term is positive. High  at one-side 
increases  and on the other side decreases that due to increase of ‘r’. If the negative effect is stronger 
than the positive effect then the resultant of the above expression will be negative.  can be improved 
such a level that the new value of ‘x’ say  again reduced to x* and  increase to r*. So each group 
member can get higher and improved skill-training from the NGO without increasing compulsory savings 
and at unchanged borrowing rate.  
       Micro finance programme under SGSY scheme permits 10% of the accumulated funds to be given to 
the NGOs for the formation of groups and for nurturing them. The release of grants to NGO is tied to 
gradations of the SHG in various stages. The failure to make gradation, results in the non-release of funds 
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to NGO which further weakening the SHGs financially and the ultimate break-up of the SHGs since the 
NGO has no money to continue to hire the service provider for training the self-help group members. So it 
is observed that most of the group members of the self-help groups under SGSY scheme are not getting 
adequate skill training from the NGOs (Kundu 2008). The NGOs also complain that they do not have 
sufficient grant to arrange skill training for the group members after formation. But this paper establishes 
the fact that initial sanction of higher amount of grant to the NGO is necessary if we want to arrange good 
and efficient skill training for the participants of the micro finance programme. This will also increase the 
consumption level of both the participants progressively without forcing the group members to save larger 
amount in each instalment. Besides that the NGO can prevent itself from charging higher lending rate to 
both the borrowers.  
Proposition 14: Linked commercial bank should keep both the lending and borrowing rate at minimum 
level in self-help group bank linkage programme.   
Initially we consider  >  and  > G. But  when . So 
 
Here also the first term is negative and the second term is positive. If the group member gives more 
importance on ‘r’ then the negative effect will be stronger than the positive effect and the resultant is 
negative. So low lending and borrowing rate charged by the linked commercial bank help the NGO to 
charge low lending rate to both the group members which ultimately will encourage them to save larger 
amount in each instalment. We know that in the group lending method, total monitoring to the group 
member is done by the assigned NGO which ultimately keeps the transaction cost of the linked 
commercial bank at low level. Low ‘i’ and high ‘G’ will help the NGO to keep ‘ ’ at high level but ‘r’ at 
low level. As at the time of joining micro-finance scheme each prospective member initially gives 
more importance on ‘r’, low ‘r’ will encourage him to save more amounts in each instalment.  
Concluding observations:  
This paper narrates public-private participation in micro-finance programme. The paper re-establishes the 
fact that even in the presence of government subsidy in micro-credit programme under joint liability 
through forming self-help group, social sanction or depriving the members from enjoying further benefits 
from the government still plays an important role of security at the time of repayment of loan. It is also 
proved that if the group members are not equally powerful in the society then in the second stage of the 
game, the powerful member applying her social influence and taking the advantage of joint liability may 
force the less-powerful member to repay her loan with interest and enjoy free ride. So positive assortative 
matching both from the economic as well as from the social point of view is necessary at the time of 
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group formation and that should be maintained in both the periods to keep repayment rate 100%. Here the 
NGO, who is working on behalf of the group is risk averse but it wants to maximize it’s utility only after 
improving the economic conditions of the group members.  This paper also shows that, the non-motivated 
NGO can offer credit to the group members at lowest possible rate of interest and can arrange good skill-
training programme for both of them provided it gets sufficient financial assistance from the government 
at the time of group formation. That also encourages each group member to save maximum amount in 
each instalment (compulsory savings) to get higher amount of credit at lowest possible rate of interest in 
future. Higher size of credit will also help them to earn higher level of income after the end of the second 
stage, which ultimately will help them to remove poverty. 
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i
 Here NGO is a motivated agent who pursues goals because he perceives intrinsic benefit from doing that (Besley and Ghatak 2005). 
ii
 According to NABARD, the rate of interest for SHGs should be market related. But following Srinivasan (2002), the final rate of 
interest on micro credit turn out to be in the range of 24% to 36% per annum. The reason for such high rate of interest is actually due to 
the margins charged by the bank, NGO and the SHG.  
iii
 Micro savings is compulsory in any micro-finance programme both under individual liability and under joint liability. But how much 
amount each group member can save in each instalment is decided solely by her. The earning of the member household is not the only 
factor which decides compulsory savings but also what she will get after joining this programme. Here the borrowing rate and intensity of 
skill development are the two important decision making factors of compulsory savings. Actually through compulsory savings each 
member sacrifices the present for benefit of the future.   
iv
 For the simplicity of our model we assume that the rate of interest changed against saving deposit by the linked commercial bank is 
uniform in the entire time period. 
v
 Here loan is sanctioned for half of the year and so  = r. 
vi
 Here following the condition of micro-credit programme after forming group, each group member has to save in installment 
continuously up to the end of first period. Suppose after taking credit both the group members have to save same amount in same number 
of installments 
vii
 Here it is assumed that the borrower belongs to self-help group does not spend any amount for monitoring her co-member as well as co-
borrower. So following Roy Chowdhury (2005), we here assumes total absence of peer monitoring among the group members.  
